INTRODUCTION
The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides that "[n]o person shall... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." ' The two preceding clauses, commonly referred to respectively as the Due Process Clause and the Takings Clause, have long been the focus of an historic battle over the proper scope of constitutional protection of private property rights. The academic and jurisprudential debates over the proper meaning and functions of the two clauses have generated a voluminous body of literature and case law. 1 U.S. CONST. amend. V. The portion of the quotation appearing before the semicolon shall, in accord with common parlance, hereinafter be referred to as the "Due Process Clause." The part of the quotation following the semicolon shall hereinafter be referred to as the "Takings Clause," although it has also been termed the "Eminent Domain Clause" and the "Just Compensation Clause" by some authors.
2 Some of the more widely recognized discussions of the takings issue are: BRUCE A. ACKERMAN process influences. Part I culminates in a discussion of the landmark case of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 1 3 and shows that Holmes's opinion for the Court recognized neither a public use limitation, nor any form of balancing test.
Part II identifies three examples of the blending of due process and takings analysis: (1) the public use limitation, (2) the substantial relationship test of Nollan v. Caiffornia Coastal Commission, and (3) balancing. First, it demonstrates that the public use limitation was directly borrowed from due process, and that the cases usually cited as recognizing such a limitation were decided strictly on due process grounds. After addressing the continuing problems associated with the public use limitation and explaining that the requirement serves no purpose other than to confuse state courts, it asserts that the public use limitation should be abandoned altogether. Second, it argues that the substantial relationship test of Nollan v. Calffornia Coastal Commission 4 has only dubious support in the case law and is subject to a number of criticisms. In particular, it asserts that the substantial relationship test does nothing more than create an exception to the minimum rationality standard of due process. Third, Part II suggests that balancing fails as a takings methodology because (1) the regulated individual's interests are not in conflict with those of society, (2) it does not adequately reflect the framers' concern for fairness, and (3) it subjects takings jurisprudence to the criticisms of Lochner without addressing the central question of who should bear the costs of regulation.
Unlike Parts I and II, which are largely historical and retrospective in nature, Part III provides a more prospective discussion of the possible future of takings jurisprudence. First, it attempts to suggest a rationale for the substantial relationship test which can be reconciled both with the social norms inherent in the famous Carolene Products footnote and with the position advanced in this Comment that all review of the "means-end fit" of a regulation should be conducted under the rubric of due process. Second, Part III examines the Court's recent decision in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council." Although it applauds the opinion for its implicit rejection of balancing, it proposes that the test established by Lucas is less meaningful than one might hope. It also points to question-842 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 142:837 able language in the opinion which detracts from the otherwise positive step it takes.
I. THE GENESIS OF A MUDDLED TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE: THE SOURCES OF "BLENDING"
The following Section discusses the forces which fostered the blending of due process and takings analysis. Part A outlines the overarching social and legal developments which made takings jurisprudence susceptible to due process influences. Part B then demonstrates how the failure of early opinions, such as Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, to adequately distinguish their due process analysis from their takings analysis has allowed later courts and observers to attribute due process tests to the Takings Clause.
A. The Social and Legal Dynamics Which Made Takings Jurisprudence Susceptible to Due Process Influences
Compared to other areas of constitutional law, most of takings jurisprudence is of relatively recent vintage. During the first century of the republic, the federal government acted more as landgrantor than land-grabber. 6 With a fairly sparse population and a vast expanse of western land yet to be settled, the federal government freely gave land to the railroads, homesteaders, and state governments.' 7 Moreover, the scope of the federal government's regulatory activity remained remarkably small; it engaged in little regulation of land use.'" Interestingly, the federal government did not even assert its own power of eminent domain until 1875.1" In addition, the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment had no application to acts of state governments before the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified in 1868.° In this context, the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment received scant attention, for there seldom existed either the need or the opportunity for litigants to invoke it. 2 In response to the social difficulties created by the industrial revolution and the rapid industrialization of the United States in the latter half of the nineteenth century, state governments began to take a more active role in the regulation of economic affairs, including the regulation of working hours and conditions under the ill-defined, but ever expansive, "police power." 2 2 Similarly, President Roosevelt's New Deal legislation catapulted the federal government to prominence in the field of socio-economic regulation. The federal courts, however, true to their conservative, counter-majoritarian tradition, and steeped in the political philosophy of John Locke and Adam Smith, resisted such assaults on economic freedom. 2 The courts raised the Due Process and Contract Clauses 24 of the United States Constitution as swords to strike down social welfare legislation and other forms of economic regulation. 25 Armed with the Due Process and Contract Clauses, courts found not only state wage and workday restrictions to be easy prey, but also thoroughly impeded the first New Deal programs. 26 Stymied by the Court's invalidation of his New Deal programs, yet desperate to lead the nation out of the Great Depression, 21 See Note, Taking Back Takings: A Coasean Approach to Regulation, 106 HARV. L. REv. 914, 918 (1993) .
1 See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 63 (1905) (noting an increase in the regulation of trade and working conditions). For an historic discussion of the nature of the police power, see ERNST FREUND, THE POLICE POWER: PUBLIC POLICY AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 3 (1904) (stating that the police power "aims directly to secure and promote the public welfare").
2 As one scholar has explained: "By forging constitutional doctrines under the Contracts Clause ... giving constitutional status to "vested rights," this line of intellectual development sought basically to limit the ability of the legal system-more specifically, of the legislature-to bring about redistributions of wealth." MORTONJ. Hoawrrz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at 255 (1977) .
2' The Contract Clause states that "No State shall... pass any... Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10. Unlike the Due Process and Takings Clauses, the Contract Clause applied to acts of state governments before the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment. It was designed principally to protect creditors from politically popular debtor relief laws, and was interpreted by the Court to do that, as well as to protect private property in various other manners. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONsTrTUnONAL LAW 613-28 (2d ed. 1988 
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President Roosevelt threatened to increase the size of the Supreme Court from nine justices to as many as fifteen in order to achieve a sympathetic majority.
27
Roosevelt's "court-packing" scheme eventually failed, largely because the Court quickly came to reject the doctrine of substantive due process in the economic context (and the analogous use of the Contract Clause). 2 8 Thanks principally to its relative obscurity and quiet history, the Takings Clause emerged from this doctrinal shift, and reversal of judicial philosophy, essentially unscathed. With the gradual increase in the use of zoning and other forms of land use restrictions, however, the Takings Clause became a more important tool for property owners anxious to forestall government intervention. The importance of the Takings Clause was further enhanced by the absence of the Due Process and Contract Clauses as tools to invalidate economic legislation.
2 ' Regulations which might once have been challenged primarily as violating principles of substantive due process could still be challenged under the Takings Clause. Indeed, creative litigators soon recognized that a variety of economic regulations could be likened to a taking of property.3°W
ith the demise of Lochner-style substantive due process in the 1930s," 1 the Takings Clause gradually emerged as the only remaining tool for invalidating regulations which interfered with property rights. 2 Unlike other constitutional doctrines which had been See LASSER, supra note 26, at 153-54 (discussing Roosevelt's court-packing plan). 28 Until the late nineteenth century, the Contract Clause was actually the "principal provision the Court used to void legislation that infringed on private property rights." NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 25, at 394; see also TRIBE, supra note 24, at 588 (noting that in the nineteenth century "the contract clause of article I, § 10, was soon located as the centerpiece of the Constitution's protective armor"). Although the scope of the Due Process and Contract Clauses are different, the level of scrutiny accorded each has, in large part, developed similarly. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 25, at 394-409.
2 See TRIBE, supra note 24, at 587 (explaining that " [w] ith the demise of the Lochner era ... there began a search for alternative methods of protecting individuals from majoritarian oppression").
Professor Tribe suggests that "two sets of restraints on governmental power" which had "antedated and informed the Lochner era" continued to retain vitality in the post-Lochner era. Id. He identifies these restraints as the norms of "regularity" and "repose," the former "expressed primarily through the ex post facto clauses, the bill of attainder clauses, and the procedural due process requirement" and the later reflected in takings jurisprudence. Id. [t] he statute takes the property of the Coal Company without due process of law." Id. at 395. Part III and Part IV respectively assert that the regulation is neither "a bona fide exercise of the police power," id. at 396, nor "a valid exercise of the right of eminent entirety of the opinion as simply an exposition on the Takings Clause, a close reading of the opinion suggests that it was roughly organized by Holmes into two fairly distinct parts, the first addressing the Due Process and Contract Clause challenges and the second addressing the Takings Clause argument.
In the first part of the opinion, Holmes postulated the following: "If we were called upon to deal with the plaintiffs' position alone, we should think it clear that the statute does not disclose a public interest sufficient to warrant so extensive a destruction of the defendant's constitutionally protected rights." 57 Commentators have seized upon this language as evidence that Holmes intended to establish some sort of a balancing test, weighing the value of the public interest advanced by the regulation against the value of the private property taken or destroyed by the regulation.
58
This language is also used to support the proposition that the Takings Clause impliedly forbids the taking of private property for any use other than public use-that is, to take property merely for the private benefit of another. A noteworthy example of the application of this misunderstanding can be found in Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987). In Keystone, the Court attempted to distinguish the case, though factually identical to Mahon, by asserting that "important public interests are served" by the regulation. Id. at 485. Recognizing that they were walking on very thin ice, however, the Court went on to argue in the alternative that "petitioners have also failed to make a showing of diminution of value sufficient to satisfy the test set forth in Pennsylvania Coal...." Id. at 492-93. The Keystone Court, however, was somewhat disingenuous in suggesting that a land use regulation would survive scrutiny under the Takings Clause merely by satisfying the public use requirement. Even if the reference to "public use" in the Takings Clause does establish a requirement that a regulation be enacted for the benefit of the general public, making the public use limitation the entire takings test controverts the true import of the Takings Clause.
' This is confirmed by Holmes's comment that the implied limitation police power places on the enjoyment of property rights "must have its limits, or the contract and due process clauses are gone." Mahon, 260 U.S. at 413. It is conceivable Due Process and Contract Clauses within the immediately preceding discussion, he had neither mentioned, nor impliedly invoked the language of the Takings Clause. 6 " As indicated, Holmes's opinion in Mahon was organized into two distinct parts. The first part of the opinion, culminating in the statement that "the statute does not disclose a public interest sufficient to warrant so extensive a destruction of the defendant's constitutionally protected rights," 6 2 merely discussed the general failure of the Kohler Act to pass constitutional muster under the Due Process and Contract Clauses for want of an overriding public interest. 6 " The first part of the opinion did not establish a "public use requirement" under the Takings Clause;' it simply held that the statute was not constitutionally permitted under the Due Process and Contract Clauses. Such analysis was required, since at the time these clauses had been held to provide substantive protection of property rights that could only be overcome by the advancement of a more weighty public interest. 6 5 As one distinguished constituthat Holmes considered the Takings Clause to be part of the Due Process Clause and was therefore referring to it in the first part of the opinion as well. Such a conclusion, however, is belied by the fact that Holmes, later in the opinion, specifically referred to the language of the Takings Clause as "[tihe protection of private property in the Fifth Amendment," id. at 415, rather than simply referring to it as a part of the Due Process Clause. To take property for other than a public purpose; to take, for instance, the property of one citizen and transfer it to another, would be a deprivation thereof without due process of law; and such a proceeding is equally unconstitutional when the appropriation is accompanied by full compensation.... For, under our Constitution, the State is incapable of itself interfering or of conferring any right to interfere with private property unless it is needed for public objects.... ... [I] wanted to establish another source of the very samejudicial inquiry that he had opposed in his Lochner dissent. 69 Even if Holmes had begrudgingly come to accept the Court's approach in Lochner by the time of Mahon, it is highly doubtful that he would have desired to create another tool for that superlegislative inquiry.
Commentators have suggested that what they perceive to be the rather vague and general treatment of the Takings Clause" is simply a manifestation of the "deep difficulties""' the case presented for Justice Holmes. 7 2 Holmes, however, apparently had little difficulty with the case, and made little, if any, effort to provide a comprehensive exposition on the meaning of the Takings Clause. Indeed, evidence suggests that although Holmes strongly believed his decision to be just, 7 4 the opinion may have been "dashed off in a great hurry." (stating that "the public only got on to this land by paying for it and ... if they saw fit to pay only for a surface right they can't enlarge it because they need it now any more than they could have taken the right of being there in the first place").
75 EPSTEIN, TAKINGS, supra note 2, at 63 n.2. 76 Mahon, 260 U.S. at 413.
Although Holmes's dissent in Lochnerdemonstrates that he personallybelieved in a more deferential standard of review than that employed by the court at the time, see Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 74-76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting), it does not mean either that the legislation would have survived scrutiny under what he felt to be the properly deferential standard, or that he was so stubborn as to refuse to apply the standard established by the Court over his objection.
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UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 142:837 not be taken for such use without compensation."78 The only grounds upon which Holmes could have confidently believed that the Takings Clause "presupposes," (i.e., "assumes") rather than "requires," a public use is the conviction that the Due Process Clause, either through its procedural or substantive component, independently bars governmental acts which do not serve the public interest.
79
The significance of the specific reference to "public use" in the Takings Clause is not meant hereby to be diminished. Indeed, it communicates the view, undoubtedly held both by the framers of the Constitution and the Mahon Court, that the Constitution permits no governmental action inconsistent with the rule of law or enacted for the personal aggrandizement of a preferred group.
80
The specific reference to "public use" in the Takings Clause certainly implies that government cannot take property for private use, but it does not necessarily imply that the protection is provided by the Takings Clause. Rather, all it demonstrates is that the framers believed that the Due Process Clause-whether or not they believed due process to encompass substantive as well as procedural rights-would guarantee that government act only in the "public" interest.
Only after having addressed the Due Process and Contract Clause challenges in the first half of the opinion, and having concluded that the statute was unconstitutional for want of a sufficiently compelling public interest, did Holmes turn to the more novel question of whether a regulation can so deprive the owner of value as to essentially constitute a "taking" requiring compensation." His analysis of the Takings Clause issue proceeds from the 80 See McGEHEE, supra note 66, at 255, 271 (asserting that transfer of property from one private citizen to another is a violation of due process); see also Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137 (1894) (finding that interests must be of the public, not of a particular class). One of the principal concerns which guided the framers in the design of the Constitution was the desire "to break and control the violence of faction." THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 41 (James Madison) (Max Beloff ed., 1987). Indeed, the framers recognized that "the most common and durable source of factions has been the various and unequal distribution ofproperty," and that"[t]hose who hold, and those who are without property, have ever formed distinct interests in society." Id. at 43. " Holmes's discussion of the Due Process and Contract Clauses ends with the conclusion that "the statute does not disclose a public interest sufficient to warrant so extensive a destruction of the defendant's constitutionally protected rights." assumption that the regulation is warranted by a sufficiently compelling public interest. 8 2 In his discussion of the Takings Clause, Holmes emphasized that private property could "not be taken for [public] use without compensation,"" 8 for it was his concern that "[w]e are in danger of forgetting that a strong public desire to improve the public condition is not enough to warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying for the change."' Holmes's language makes clear that the Takings Clause bars government actions which are deemed "takings" regardless of the existence of a public interest of the greatest magnitude. As he asserts in the final paragraph of the opinion,
[w]e assume, of course, that the statute was passed upon the conviction that an exigency existed that would warrant it, and we assume that an exigency exists that would warrant the exercise of eminent domain. But the question at bottom is upon whom the loss of the changes desired should fall.
5
The foregoing analysis suggests that Holmes's opinion in Mahon was intended neither to establish a public use requirement nor to establish any form of balancing test under the Takings Clause. Although the language in the first part of the opinion has been interpreted to the contrary, a more compelling argument can be made that the first part of the opinion addressed only Due Process and Contract Clause analysis.
8
Regardless of what type of analysis
Mahon, 260 U.S. at 414. After reaching that conclusion, Holmes embarks upon a discussion of the Takings Clause and makes no further reference to the Due Process Clause, the Contract Clause, or anything else resembling a public use requirement or balancing test. See id. at 414-16. The change in Holmes's subject of discussion is marked by a transitional paragraph which reads: But the case has been treated as one in which the general validity of the act should be discussed. The Attorney General of the state, the dty of Scranton, and the representatives of other extensive interests, were allowed to take part in the argument below, and have submitted their contentions here. It seems, therefore, to be our duty to go farther in the statement of our opinion, in order that it may be known at once, and that further suits should not be brought in vain.
Id. at 414. Holmes actually sought to establish in Mahon, it is clear that he failed to the extent that the opinion was unable to clearly settle even the most general principles of takings jurisprudence. Its lack of clarity, if nothing else, has contributed to the subsequent resurrection of elements of substantive due process.
II. THE MANIFESTATIONS OF THE BLENDING PHENOMENON
The desire to achieve the same results once obtained by resort to substantive due process gradually led the Court to embrace several tests that had once been employed under the rubric of due process. The principal manifestations of this blending phenomenon include the public use requirement, balancing, and the substantial relationship test of Nollan v. California Coastal Commission. The following Section discusses each of these in turn, explaining their illegitimate genealogy, discussing their flaws, and demonstrating how they threaten the long-term vitality of takings jurisprudence as a guarantor of private property rights.
A. Ends Analysis: The Public Use Requirement
Whether or not Mahon endorsed or employed such a doctrine, the principle that the reference to "public use" in the Takings Clause implicitly forbids takings for other than public use has become well accepted in takings jurisprudence."
7
The following 3) I<PorNoI=T 4) P>X=T 5) P>X,orNoI=T 6) P>XorI<P=T I = public interest advanced by regulation P = value of private property rights destroyed by regulation X = threshold at which a regulation constitutes a "taking"
The foregoing analysis suggests that equation number four is the only correct interpretation of Holmes's opinion in Mahon, for only it contains neither a public use requirement nor a balancing test. The test it does contain is the only true legacy of Holmes's opinion in Mahon, the so-called "diminution in value test." See supra note 47.
I submit that Holmes would maintain that the absence of a valid public interest (equation 1) would prove fatal under the Due Process Clause, even though it would not under the Takings Clause.
The equations in this note were devised by Professor Frank I. Goodman of the University of Pennsylvania Law School and are printed with his permission.
17 As Professor Merrill explains: American courts have long construed [the reference to "public use" in the Takings Clause] to mean that some showing of "publicness" is a condition analysis demonstrates, however, that the historic foundations upon which the public use requirement has beenjustified are flawed. The cases cited as establishing the public use requirement were actually based on principles of natural law" and substantive due process 9 rather than the language of the Takings Clause. Although they have since been misinterpreted to be takings cases, such cases were never intended to stand for the proposition that the Takings Clause establishes a public use requirement. Moreover, the public use requirement serves no practical purpose in contemporary takings jurisprudence. 0 Yet while the public use requirement, according precedent to a legitimate exercise of the power of eminent domain. Thus, when a proposed condemnation of property lacks the appropriate public quality, the taking is deemed to be unconstitutional and can be enjoined. Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 61, 61 (1986); see also DUKEMINIER, supra note 53, at 991 (stating that the prevailing view is that property may be taken only for "public use"); GERALD GuNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 485-87 (11th ed. 1985) (arguing that the modern Court interprets "public use" broadly).
See infra notes 94-107 and accompanying text. 89 See infra notes 113-24 and accompanying text. o The level of review demanded by the public use requirement was significantly diminished by Berman v. Parker, 348 U. S. 26, 32-34 (1954) , and was essentially equated with the minimum rationality review of due process by Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 239-43 (1984) . In Berman, the Court held that the legislature is "the main guardian of the public needs," and that thejudiciary's role in "determiningwhether that power is being exercised for a public purpose is an extremely narrow one." Berman, 348 U.S. at 32. For further evidence of the great flexibility of the public use requirement, see Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455,458-60 (Mich. 1981) (holding that the condemnation of land to convey it to General Motors as a factory cite had a sufficiently public purpose because it would benefit the community by creating jobs and tax revenues); City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 646 P.2d 835, 841-44 (Cal. 1982 ) (holding that property rights in a professional football team are a legitimate subject for an exercise of eminent domain).
While I believe that Professor Merrill agrees with my characterization of the public use limitation as being devoid of practical significance because of its reliance on ends analysis, Merrill suggests that new life could be breathed into the public use limitation by transforming it into a form of means analysis. See Merrill, supra note 87, at 66-74. Merrill would recast the inquiry of the public use limitation from one which asks whether the object sought by the government act is legitimate to one which asks whether, assuming that the government end is legitimate, the use of eminent domain as a means of accomplishing that end is permissible. In defense of this reformulation of the public use requirement, Merrill suggests that means analysis is "more narrowly focused and judicially manageable" than examination of the ends of government action. Id. at 67. Unfortunately, Merrill's assumption that means analysis is somehow better than ends analysis is thoroughly indefensible. For the courts to independently determine the necessity or desirability of the use of eminent domain would require a fact-intensive inquiry into the feasibility of the use of other techniques, such as private bargaining in every case, and would thereby both open the
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9 2
The Illegitimate Pedigree of the Public Use Requirement
The modern public use requirement has a long and mysterious history. It was not born suddenly in some landmark opinion of the High Court; rather, it has evolved slowly over time, waxing and waning with the winds of political philosophy and practical necessity.
9s
The first discernible roots of the public use requirement did not rely on the specific language of the Constitution. Rather, they were based on principles of "natural law" 94 and the "fundamental maxims of a free government." 9 5 In one of the earliest cases to which the public use requirement can be traced, Wilkinson v. Leland, 9 " the Supreme Court stated:
The fundamental maxims of a free government seem to require, that the rights of personal liberty and private property should be held sacred. At least no court ofjustice in this country would be warranted in assuming, that the power to violate and disregard them; a power so repugnant to the common principles of justice and civil liberty; lurked under any general grant of legislative authority, or ought to be implied from any general expressions of the will of the people. The people ought not to be presumed to part with rights so vital to their security and well being .... We know of no case, in which a legislative act to transfer the property of A. to B. without his consent, has ever been held a constitutional exercise of legislative power in any state in the union. On the contrary, it has been constantly resisted as inconsistent with just gates to needless litigation and place the courts in a role for which they are poorly equipped. 
TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE
principles, by every judicial tribunal in which it has been attempted to be enforced. 7
Without a reference to either the Due Process Clause or the Takings Clause, the Court held in Wilkinson that it was beyond the power of a state legislature to take property from one person merely to give it to another." 8 It is important to note that Wilkinson invalidated a Rhode Island statute which essentially had the effect of transferring property from one person to another, despite the fact that the Fourteenth Amendment had not yet even been ratified. 9 Moreover, the Fifth Amendment has always been understood to apply only to the federal government. ' Thus, in The Court expressly stated that "where the purpose for which the tax was to be issued... was purely in aid of private or personal objects, the law authorizing it was beyond the legislative power, and was an unauthorized invasion of private right."
05 Just as in Wilkinson,
the Court failed to point to any specific provision of the Constitution which declared such a tax "beyond the legislative power," but rather rested its decision on general notions of political philosophy or natural law. The Court justified its holding by simply asserting that:
[T]here are such rights in every free government beyond the control of the State.
There are limitations on such power which grow out of the essential nature of all free governments. Implied reservations of individual rights, without which the social compact could not exist, o See id. at 664 ("We have established, we think, beyond cavil that there can be no lawful tax which is not laid for a public purpose." (emphasis omitted)). forcefully asserted that "neither the State nor Federal courts can declare a statute of the State void as unwise, unjust, or inexpedient, nor for any other cause, unless it be repugnant to the Federal Constitution.""' Further, he argued that "[c]ourts cannot nullify an act of the State legislature on the vague ground that they think it opposed to a general latent spirit supposed to pervade or underlie the constitution, where neither the terms nor the implications of the instrument disclose any such restriction.""' To do so, he maintained, would "make the courts sovereign over both the constitution and the people, and convert the government into a judicial despotism.""'
With time, the positivist view advanced by Justice Clifford began to take root both on and off the Court."
2 Accordingly, the Court made greater efforts to ground its decisions in the specific language of the Constitution. The Court, however, had already embraced the public use limitation-a broad principle which could not easily be made to fit into one constitutional pigeonhole. The Court at first rejected arguments that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited states from taking private property without just compensation.
In 112 See NICHOLS, THE LAw, supra note 102, at 119-20 (noting acceptance of doctrine that courts could not strike down a legislative act unless it violated a specific provision of the Constitution); Note, The Public Use Limitation, supra note 19, at 602 (describing courts' abandonment of "natural law" for strict constitutional interpretation). For an illustration of the rise of positivism and the decline of natural law see Southern Pac. Co. v.Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting) If private property be taken for public uses without just compensation, it must be remembered that, when the fourteenth amendment was adopted, the provision on that subject, in immediate juxtaposition in the fifth amendment with the one we are construing, was left out, and this was taken. It may possibly violate some of those principles of general constitutional law, of which we could take jurisdiction if we were sitting in review of a Circuit Court of the United States, as we were in Loan Association v. Topeka. But... it is not possible to hold that a party has, without due process of law, been deprived of his property.., when.., he has ... a fair trial in a court ofjustice .... In the Fourteenth Amendment the provision regarding the taking of private property is omitted, and the prohibition against the State is confined to its depriving any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. It is claimed, however, that the citizen is deprived of his property without due process of law, if it be taken by or under state authority for any other than a public use, either under the guise of taxation or by the assumption of the right of eminent domain. In that way the question whether private property has been taken for any other than a public use becomes material in this court, even where the taking is under the authority of the State instead of the Federal government. Id. at 158.
It is also worth noting that although Justice Peckham alluded to the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, thereby raising the suggestion that the mention of "public use" in the Takings Clause establishes a public use requirement, he refused to acknowledge it as establishing such a limitation and noted that, in any event, it "applies only to the Federal government." Id. 
The Modern Function of the Public Use Requirement
Although the precise meaning of the public use limitation has evolved greatly over time, 27 it is clear that the public use requirement currently employed by the Court fails to serve any function that is not already satisfied by due process. 125 The Court's course of action was entirely proper, for "a land use regulation advancing an illegitimate public purpose ... does not 'take' property in the customary sense because of its illegitimacy." Jerold S. Kayden, Land Use Regulations, Rationality, andJudicial Review: The RSVP in the Nollan Invitation (Part I), 23 URB. LAW. 301, 320 (1991) . Indeed, such an interpretation would have been consistent with the prevailing vision of the purpose and nature of the Due Process Clause. Among all of the provisions of the Bill of Rights, no clause so aptly and fundamentally embodies the principle that ours is a government of laws and not of men. See Giozza v. Tiernan, 148 U.S. 657, 662 (1893) ("[D]ue process of law.., is secured if the laws operate on all alike, and do not subject the individual to an arbitrary exercise of the powers of government." (citation omitted)). Indeed, the Due Process Clause was essentially designed to stand as a shield against arbitrary or capricious acts of government and to ensure the general and evenhanded enforcement of the rule of law. See MCGEHEE, supra note 66, at 60.64. As the Supreme Court has explained, " [t] he words, 'due process of law,' were undoubtedly intended to convey the same meaning as the words, 'by the law of the land,' With the decline of substantive due process, 13 ' a public use requirement within the Takings Clause might have continued to provide an opportunity for substantive judicial review of at least some forms of economic regulation. The same political and judicial philosophies which dealt a deathblow to Lochner-style substantive due process, however, were equally hostile to other types ofjudicial inquiry into the "ends" of legislative action.
2
This hostility toward all kinds of substantive judicial review likely arose from a feeling that when the judiciary acts as a "superlegislature," it matters not whether it does so under the rubric of the Due Process Clause or the Talkngs Clause, for in either case it serves to destroy the delicate constitutional scheme of separation of powers, and, in so confuses eminent domain with due process).
12 152 U.S. 133 (1894); see also Stoebuck, supra note 3, at 1065-66 (asserting the similarity of public purpose balancing test to the Lawton substantive due process test). Indeed, "the crisis in democratic theory generated by judicial opposition to the New Deal" 4 provided the impetus not only for the rejection of substantive due process, but for the abandonment of de novo judicial review of "legislative declarations of public use."185 The culmination of this judicial philosophy was Justice Douglas's opinion for the Court in Berman v. Parker, 8 5 in which he proclaimed that "when the legislature has spoken, the public interest has been declared in terms well-nigh conclusive." 1 7 It is interesting to note that although the opinion in Berman cites a number of cases as supporting judicial deference to legislative determinations of public use, all of the cited cases are due process cases.
3 ' Assuming that the Court knew this, we can only conclude that the Court must have believed that the democratic principles which necessitated the rejection of Lochner-style substantive due process applied with equal force to the public use requirement of the Takings Clause.
Today, the much-reduced public use requirement'" 9 merely
restates the minimum rationality test of contemporary substantive due process analysis. 4 ' As the Court recently explained, "where the exercise of the eminent domain power is rationally related to a conceivable public purpose, the Court has never held a compensated taking to be proscribed by the Public Use Clause."' 41 Indeed, the federal courts have found a public use in every takings case ... For an insightful discussion of principles supporting judicial restraint, see generally Wallace, supra note 11; Wallace, supra note 90. From a somewhat different perspective, Professor C. Edwin Baker effectively argues that judicia usurpation of political decisions under the rubric of the Takings Clause "reduces the incentives for improving the political process." Baker, supra note 6, at 769.
'" Merrill, supra note 87, at 68. since Berman established the highly deferential standard of modem public use review in 1954.142 There is no apparent reason for the Court to persist in the charade of a Takings Clause inquiry, when in so doing it merely employs the same test used in due process analysis. 43 As Professor Stoebuck explains:
The existence of a public purpose is really one of the elements in the test for due process. The question of public purpose goes to the question of whether the governmental entity has the power to impose the particular regulation [even with compensation]. A regulation is void if the answer to the due process question is negative, and one need not-cannot-then ask if the regulation is a taking. Should the answer to the due process question be affirmative, then one may go on to the taking issue. If public purpose is considered again at this stage, the taking issue becomes a replay of the due process questions.
44
What we refer to in the context of takings jurisprudence as the "public use requirement" is nothing more than "ends analysis"-that is, judging whether the end is sufficiently legitimate to empower government to impose the regulation. Ends analysis under the Takings Clause and due process should not be different. The concept of "property" need not be limited to physical, tangible items, but should more properly be seen as encompassing legal rights and privileges.' [Vol. 142:837 rights that have been held to be "property" for purposes of the Takings Clause include: the hunting rights of members of a duck hunting club, 1 4 6 and trade secrets taken in the course of pesticide registration by the Environmental Protection Agency.' 47 Thus, virtually any economic due process challenge can easily be rephrased by a creative litigator into a takings challenge. To allow the ends tests of due process and the public use limitation inquiries to differ, therefore, is to dispense different brands ofjustice according to the form rather than the substance of the case. 148 Clearly, the Court recognizes the dangers inherent in establishing different standards of public use under the Takings and Due Process Clauses. In Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, it took great pains to equate the public use requirement of the Takings Clause with the minimum rationality standard of due process. Nevertheless, I believe that the Court erred in its approach, and should instead have taken the opportunity to explain that the public use requirement is and has always been purely a product of due process and its natural law antecedents.
Although Due Process and Takings Clause inquiries into public use may be substantially identical in theory thanks to the Court's opinion in Midkiff, empirical evidence demonstrates that they are applied differently in practice. Although such dissimilar treatment is apparently not a significant problem in the federal courts, state courts are frequently "willing to depart from Berman's virtual abandonment of judicial review" in their treatment of public use superficially temporary taking of property may in fact constitute a permanent, complete taking); see also ACKERMAN, supra note 2, at 166 ("Unlike our ancestors, we no longer count our wealth by looking first to our social property of land, farms, buildings. Instead, our principal means of support consist of legal property: stocks, bonds, pensions .. At the time the Constitution was framed, the concept of "property" was certainly not limited to physical possessions, but included rights and liberties as well. See REID, supra note 103, at 72 ("[Plroperty, even the concept of property as material accumulation, was not limited to the physical in the eighteenth century.").
4 See Swan Lake Hunting Club v. United States, 381 F.2d 238, 240 (5th Cir.
1967).
1 questions in Takings Clause analysis. 49 Between 1964 and 1985, over sixteen percent of all public use cases in state appellate courts invalidated proposed takings on the grounds that the taking did not serve a public use. 5 Moreover, the percentage of state court cases finding no public use has almost doubled, from 11.8% for the period 1954-1960 to 20.4% for the period 1981-1985."l' Although the Court's reaffirmation of Berman in Midkiff may have been designed in part to stem this increase in the use of the public use requirement, Berman is cited in only three of the twenty-four cases in Merrill's survey decided after Midkiff' 5 2 Clearly, "judicial enforcement of the public use requirement is not a thing of the past,"' 53 and it appears likely that only the outright abolition of the public use requirement will ensure that judicial review will conform in practice to the constitutionally-mandated' deferential standard of due process.
Furthermore, eliminating the public use requirement altogether would ensure that it never returns in a less deferential form. No matter how remote a possibility such a return might seem in the near future, the law is seldom static, and the distant future cannot be easily predicted. Indeed, prominent professors such as Frank I. Michelman and Richard Epstein have proposed public use tests which would vastly expand the scope and depth ofjudicial review of legislative ends in the eminent domain context.' 5 5 Any doubt that the Court would ever use the public use requirement of the Takings Clause in a manner substantially different from due process should 14 Merrill, supra note 87, at 96. 150 See id. 1 See id. at 97. Merrill's survey found that the number of public use cases in each five-year period was "fairly constant, ranging from 42 to 61 cases in each period from 1954-1985." Id. Merrill also notes that "the percentage of cases holding that a taking does not serve a public use generally increases throughout the 31-year period. The percentages are as follows : 1954-1960 Michelman,Just Compensation, supra note 2, at 1241 (discussing utilitarian property theory, which would mandate that only those uses of eminent domain which the court believes would produce a net benefit to society be deemed to serve the public use).
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868 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 142:837 be tempered by the fact that the Court has done just that in the context of means-end scrutiny. As Jerold S. Kayden explains:
The debate over whether a land-use regulation violates due process, equal protection, or just compensation is more than academic. To begin with, it is just such a quibble that Justice Scalia exploited to pen Nollan's footnote three. He embraced the undeniable fact that the just compensation clause is not the due process or equal protection clause to invest just compensation's "substantial" with a different meaning, thereby inventing a higher standard of rationality review than otherwise available.
6
Purging the public use requirement from takings jurisprudence would also guard against even more dangerous misinterpretations of the requirement. In the past, for example, lawyers have argued that the reference to "public use" in the Takings Clause means not that the government may take property only for public use, but rather that government must compensate only when the taking lacks a public use.' Mahon could be distinguished simply on the basis of a finding of a public use.
59
Of course, so long as the public use requirement is applied by the courts in precisely the same manner they apply due process, there is little to fear, for the outcome in any case will be the same. The greatest danger lies in the potential for the requirement to be changed in subsequent decisions. Indeed, although the Court's ends analysis has been harmonized with that of due process, its means-ends scrutiny has recently diverged from that of due process. life under the rubric of the Takings Clause. In Nollan, James and Marilyn Nollan sought to replace their dilapidated beach-front bungalow with a three-bedroom house and an attached garage. As required by state law, the Nollans applied to the California Coastal Commission for a development permit. 1 62 The Commission agreed to grant the development permit, but only on the condition that the Nollans dedicate a ten-foot wide easement just inland of the mean high tide line so that the public could cross the Nollans' private beach as they walked along the coast. 6 While the lateral access easement would certainly have provided legitimate benefits to the public,' the Court rejected the easement condition because the easement failed to advance the Commission's avowed goal of preserving visual access to the sea. 1 6 ' As the Court explained:
B. Heightened Means-End
It is quite impossible to understand how a requirement that people already on the public beaches be able to walk across the Nollans' property reduces any obstacles to viewing the beach created by the new house. It is also impossible to understand... how it helps to remedy any additional congestion on [the public beaches] caused by construction of the Nollans' new house. 166 The opinion would not have stirred much controversy had it merely affirmed the due process requirement that a regulation bear some "rational relationship" to a legitimate government objective. Justice Scalia indicated, however, that the Court would apply a heightened standard of means-end rationality to at least some forms of takings challenges. 167 Justice Scalia's 5-4 opinion for the Court in Nollan asserted not only that land use regulations which condition development upon an exaction must "substantially advance" 1 6 a legitimate public interest, but that "the permit condition [must] serve[] the same governmental purpose as the development ban." [Vol. 142:837 Most importantly, Justice Scalia argued in footnote three, that the standards to be applied in Takings Clause cases are not the same as those to be applied in due process or equal protection cases. As Justice Scalia explained:
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Contrary to Justice Brennan's claim... our opinions do not establish that these standards are the same as those applied to due process or equal protection claims. To the contrary, our verbal formulations in the takings field have generally been quite different. We have required that the regulation "substantially advance" the "legitimate state interest" sought to be achieved, Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980) , not that "the State 'could rationally have decided' that the measure adopted might achieve the State's objective." [Brennan Dissent] quoting Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creameiy Co., 449 U.S. 456, 466 (1981) . Justice Brennan relies principally on ... an equal protection case.., and two substantive due process cases.., in support of the standards he would adopt. But there is no reason to believe.., that so long as the regulation of property is at issue the standards for takings challenges, due process challenges, and equal protection challenges are identical
170
While Justice Scalia criticizes Justice Brennan for relying "principally on an equal protection case ... and two substantive due process cases " 171 to support the application of the deferential "rational relationship" test, he fails to recognize that his "substantially advance" formulation is "directly traceable" 172 to due process and equal protection cases as well. As Professor Kayden explains, "Justice Scalia adopted the word 'substantial' from Agins v. Moreover, while the wording may be somewhat different, there is significant evidence that Justice Scalia's "substantially advance" terminology has historically had the same deferential meaning in the takings context asJustice Brennan's "could rationally have decided" formulation.'
These "adjectives [have been] used interchangeably by the Court ... for more than sixty years to describe the necessary relation between means and ends."' 8 ' While it intuitively seems just that government should only take property for uses directly connected with the avowed public use, the Court's holding in Nollan implicates many of the same concerns as the public use requirement. ' In light of Nollan and its semantic underpinnings, analysis of the public use requirement suggests that all inquiry into the ends of economic legislation should be conducted under due process and its respective standard. It follows a fortiori that means-end analysis should thus also be conducted exclusively under the framework of due process. Surely, if the ends analysis of the public use requirement is to be defined by due process, or, in the words of the Court, is to be "coterminous with the scope of a sovereign's police powers," 83 then means-end analysis under the Takings Clause should also be identical to that of due process.
Means-end rationality in the Takings Clause is similar to the public use limitation in that, "the customary meaning, structure, and purpose of the [Takings Clause] suggest that means-end rationality is not a core concern of takings inquiry."184 Indeed, "a land-use regulation advancing an illegitimate public purpose or irrationally advancing a legitimate one does not 'take' property in the customary sense because of its illegitimacy or irrationality." 8 5 Means-end rationality is, however, the historic guardian against arbitrary and " See Kayden, supra note 125, at 302-09 (asserting that the pre-Nollan cases employed deferential review despite the use of the adjective "substantial"). Kayden further concludes that: [T] here is nothing in the just compensation clause ... to suggest that "substantial" expresses a higher standard than "reasonable," "rational," or "conceivable".. for the central issue presented in the case is whether government should be able to deprive a person of a right he or she should have been able to enjoy for a purpose unrelated to the public interest by which the state justifies its restriction.' Perhaps Justice Scalia's discussion in the case should not be focused on efforts to expand the scope of the Takings Clause, but rather to suggest alternative methods of ensuring due process where the current minimum rationality standard fails. The Court has already held, in other contexts, that substantive due process is satisfied if any rational relationship exists between the means employed by government and a legitimate end sought to be achieved, regardless of what the government's actual purpose may be.
8 9 By requiring the permit condition to advance the same purpose as the development ban, Justice Scalia actually requires an examination of the actual or avowed purpose of the exaction, rather than a determination of whether a conceivable rational relationship exists. If, for example, the Coastal Commission had declared its public purpose to be increased use access, rather than visual access, an easement of lateral access would have substantially advanced a legitimate public purpose.
If the Court is now unhappy with the level of means-end scrutiny provided by due process, it should correct this problem at the source, rather than by making an end-run around due process via the Takings Clause.' Such efforts not only "direct[] attention
.. See supra note 125.
18 One commentator has described Nollan as "an attempt to uphold the rule of law against the potential for official arbitrariness." Stewart E. Sterk, Nollan, Henly George and Exactions, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1731 , 1751 (1988 . The phrases "rule of law" and "official arbitrariness" smack of due process.
" As Professor William A. away from the Court's deeper concern with fairness,"191 and subject takings jurisprudence to the same criticisms which ultimately discredited Lochner-style substantive due process,' 9 2 but they also divert energy and attention away from the resolution of the most significant Takings Clause problem-the establishment of a principled and workable means of defining what constitutes a "taking."
C. Balancing
Much of the academic debate over the Takings Clause has focused on the relative merits of a balancing approach as compared to the categorical approach' 9 3 gradually being established by the modern Court.1 94 The purpose of this Section is not only to reiterate the general debate over the propriety of balancing or to explain broadly why balancing is an inefficient and unjust methodology for takings jurisprudence, but to address the ways in which Professor Michelman suggests that ifNollan is not narrowly construed as applying only to cases in which a permanent physical occupation is threatened, litigants will rush to plead "taking" in order to invoke heightened means-end scrutiny. As Michelman explains:
What follows if we take at face value the proposition that takings claims, like free-speech claims, beget heightened scrutiny as compared with ordinary economic due process and equal protection claims?... [W] henever someone challenges a land-use regulation as a taking, rather than challenging it as a simple deprivation of property without due process, there will be an obvious problem of how to tell whether the case really and truly involves a takings challenge meriting intensified means-end scrutiny. One possible answer is that it isjust a matter of pleading... Any aggrieved owner prefers intensified scrutiny and thus would plead "taking," not "deprivation without due process" or "denial of equal protection." Michelman, supra note 3, at 1613. 191 Kayden, supra note 125, at 331. 192 Indeed, active nondeferentialjudicial review of legislative "ends" and "means" is especially subject to criticism because of its anti-democratic nature and because of the threat it poses to the constitutional scheme of separation of powers. 194 Some commentators have suggested that the Court has reacted against balancing in its recent decisions and is moving toward a per se categorical approach. See Michelman, supra note 3, at 1621-22 (noting that the Court seems to be moving "towards a reformalization of regulatory-takings doctrine"); Radin, supra note 145, at 1681-82 (discussing the apparent move of the Court towards a more formal method of takings jurisprudence).
balancing merely duplicates substantive due process analysis, and thereby robs takings jurisprudence of its true and independent significance.
Is The Court Really Balancing?
To a large extent, commentators have been unable to reach a consensus on whether the Supreme Court actually employs a balancing approach, comparing the relative value of the private property rights destroyed to the value of the public interest being advanced, 195 or merely engages in ad hoc factual determinations regarding the magnitude and character of the destruction of private property rights.
196 Yet, regardless of whether the Supreme Court actually employs a balancing test, there is certainly "a balancing 'strain' running through the eminent domain opinions." 9 7 Indeed, practitioners generally believe that regardless of what methods the courts say they are employing, they are actually doing nothing more than balancing.
98
195 For an explanation of the balancing test, see Michelman, Just Compensation, supra note 2, at 1193 (explaining that the "contemplated gain of society" should be compared with the harm to the individual).
1 For commentary expressing the belief that the Court is actually engaged in balancing, see Van Alstyne, supra note 12, at 37-41 (arguing that courts consider "whether the public interest advanced is worth the price"). Balancing suggests that "there are persons in society whose interests can somehow be excluded from, and counterpoised against, 'society's interests. '" ' 99 Imagining that the person from whom the government intends to take private property has interests opposed to those of society makes it easier to justify forcing him to yield. But the individual from whom property is being taken does not necessarily have interests which conflict with those of society. The owner of property being taken or regulated for the public benefit may himself believe the cause for which his land is being taken to be a noble one. His only conflict of interest with society is over who should bear the costs of the regulation or taking. Although society would like to force the burdened individual to bear the entire cost of the taking himself, the individual would prefer to have society compensate him for his loss and distribute the costs throughout society.
When viewed in this light, the individual's claim to compensation is more difficult to reject. Why should one individual bear the entire cost of a regulation which benefits others or society as a whole? Should not those who enjoy the fruits of government action contribute to defray the costs of such action?
b. Balancing Fails to Ensure Fairness to the Politically Weak and Does a Poor Job of Maximizing Efficiency
Although balancing may or may not be an efficient takings test, 2 "' the principal concern of the Takings Clause is not necessarily the net maximization of social value or utility. 20 ' While efficiency is undoubtedly an important aim, the most fundamental concern embodied in the Takings Clause is that of fairness-that government not advance public interests at the expense of particu-I" Michelman,Just Compensation, supra note 2, at 1194. 200 For arguments that balancing is an inefficient takings methodology, see RoseAckerman, supra note 193, at 1700-02.
201 While efficiency concerns are certainly valid and important, they should be secondary to fairness concerns. The Constitution often tolerates inefficiency as the necessary price ofsecuringliberty. The Constitution's elaborate system of checks and balances, for example, reduces the potential for tyranny but does so only at the expense of governmental efficiency. It is founded upon a justifiable fear of the evils of faction, and the framers' understanding of the potential for a democratic majority to oppress and exploit political minorities.
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0 3
Meaningful judicial review is most important under circumstances in which there is reason to believe that the political processes have failed.
204 Indeed, it is highly likely that the political processes will fail to protect the individual when government seeks to take his property for the use of society as a whole.
20 5
Since every member of society other than the burdened individual will gain through his loss, the individual will likely find few, if any, political allies.
Balancing, however, fails to provide the sort of meaningful judicial review needed to protect individuals from the natural shortcomings of the democratic processes in the takings context. For a court to uphold a regulation under a balancing approach, it must find that the value of the public interest advanced by the regulation is greater than the value of the private right being destroyed. Yet even if this condition is satisfied, balancing does not necessarily ensure that the site chosen for the exercise of eminent domain is the most cost-effective, rather than just the one which subjects the government to the least amount of political pressure. ("[A] voidance of disproportionately placed burdens is the essence of the just compensation requirement."); Sax, Police Power, supra note 2, at 57 (" [T] he English and American authorities writing at about the time of the adoption of the fifth amendment also viewed the provision as a bulwark against unfairness, rather than against mere value diminution.").
"0 See Fischel, supra note 188, at 1582 (noting that the real problem addressed by the Takings Clause is "of political majorities ganging up on effete minorities"); Sax, Police Power, supra note 2, at 57 ("What seemed to concern the early writers was... the exercise of arbitrary or tyrannical powers .... The examples they give suggest a principal fear of ill-considered, hasty, or even discriminatory impositions created by the pressing necessity of the state to get a job done ... ."); see also JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUsT 77-88 (1980) (discussing the plight of minority groups in representative government); THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison).
204 See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938) (stating that "prejudice against discrete and insular minorities" might "seriously... curtail the operation of... political processes" and would, therefore, require "more searching judicial inquiry").
... See Kmiec, supra note 202, at 1640 (describing the "constitutional structure" as "designed to counteract the majoritarian tendency to isolate individual citizens for disproportionate burdens").
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from bearing a disproportionate burden of the costs of regulation.
6
Moreover, balancing clearly provides inadequate protection of property rights. In almost all cases, the government's interest will have a more lofty and noble-sounding purpose than that of the individual. Since the judiciary can only evaluate the subjective values of the private and public interests, it is very likely that the judiciary will find society's interests more compelling. It is now regarded as fundamental that judgments regarding the desirability of social and economic regulation-judgments which naturally rely on a balancing of the respective costs and benefits-are properly within the scope of the legislative, and not the judicial branch of government. As Professor C. Edwin Baker notes, even "[c]riteria like the Chicago-school 206 Although the person whose land is condemned is theoretically compensated fairly for the loss, such compensation does not include any idiosyncratic value which may be lost. Thus, from the perspective of the person whose land is being condemned, the compensation will almost always seem inadequate.
20 Michelman, supra note 3, at 1621. 208 152 U.S. 133, 137 (1894) (stating that the state must exercise its police powers through reasonably necessary means and for the benefit of the general public). 20 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905) (holding that the state cannot interfere with contract rights without legitimate and substantialjustification for the use of its police power).
211 See Stoebuck, supra note 3, at 1066 (arguing that it is inappropriate to use the Lawton balancing test as an eminent domain taking test in that it would lead to appropriation without compensation when a strong public need existed and " [t] hat no court would reach this result").
21
For an enduring criticism of the substantive due process approach of Lochner and Lawton, see Holmes's dissent in Lochner, 198 U.S. at 74 (Holmes,J., dissenting) (arguing that "a constitution is not intended to embody a particular economic theory"); see also supra note 5 (discussing cases which reject the doctrine of substantive due process in the economic context).
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economists' notions of 'efficiency' and 'wealth maximization' are meaningful only in relation to a given set of goals."
212 Thus, to attempt to effectuate the commandment of the Takings Clause with the intellectually and doctrinally bankrupt shell of substantive due process is to deprive the clause of its intended effect and to discard the protection of liberty which the Takings Clause affords. The Takings Clause demands a more exacting form of scrutiny than that now afforded by modern substantive due process, but to substitute the failed approach of Lochner-style substantive due process is unimaginative and unhelpful, if not certainly doomed to fail.
A balancing approach necessarily weighs the social gain contemplated by the regulation against the individual losses occasioned by it. While such a test ensures that the regulation will only be valid if it tends to increase net social value, it does not resolve the fundamental question of who should bear the costs of the regulation. As Justice Holmes noted in Mahon, "the question at bottom is upon whom the loss of the changes desired should fall"211-not whether the desired changes should be permitted at all. Balancing fails to answer the most difficult, partially normative, question of who should bear the costs of regulation. It does provide a framework for deciding when an exercise of eminent domain is socially advantageous, but that, in reality, is the type of analysis properly left to the legislative and not the judicial branch of government.
III. THE FUTURE
In recent years, the Supreme Court has demonstrated a desire to breathe new life into the Takings Clause and to ensure that private property rights receive meaningful constitutional protection. One can only wonder what further steps the Court might take to revitalize the Takings Clause. While the Court has enhanced the protection of private property in a number of ways, two developments are particularly relevant to the issues presented in this Comment.
The first is Nollan's rejection of the minimum rationality standard of due process and its holding that an exaction must "substantially advance" a "legitimate state interest." 214 It is un-212 Baker, supra note 6, at 767. 21 Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922) . 214 Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834 (quoting Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980) ).
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clear whether the Court will, in the future, find the substantial relationship test to apply to all takings cases or whether it will limit or reject its application in cases other than those involving exactions. If the substantial relationship test is to endure, it cannot be justified simply on the ground that older cases such as Nectow and Euclid employed the "substantially advance" language. This is especially true considering that Nectow and Euclid were decided under due process analysis before the rejection of Lochner-style substantive due process.
The second development is an attempt, reflected first in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 215 and more recently in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 216 to reduce the necessity for ad hoc determinations by establishing categorical rules delineating situations in which a per se taking has occurred. This effort is laudable not only because it will produce more workable rules and provide guidance to lower courts, but also because it implicitly rejects balancing and any other examination of the public use advanced by the regulation. What remains to be seen is whether Loretto and Lucas are the beginning of a process that will ultimately result in a general transformation of takings jurisprudence from a body of ad hoc decisions to a formal set of categorical rules or whether Loretto and Lucas will remain isolated exceptions from the general rule that takings will be judged by ad hoc factual determinations.
A. Putting Carolene Products, to Task: Can Landowners Be a Discrete and Insular Minority?
substantial relationship test and apply the rational relationship test employed in due process analysis generally; (2) it can limit the applicability of the substantial relationship test to cases such as Nollan in which the governments seeks an exaction; (3) it can establish a set of criteria for determining when heightened meansend scrutiny under the substantial relationship formula should be undertaken that would not necessarily limit its application to cases involving exactions; and (4) it can find that the substantial relationship test applies to all takings cases. If the substantial relationship test is to endure in any form, however, it must be justified by more than semantics. Although the treatment of Nollan above suggests that the substantial relationship test is directly traceable to Nectow, Euclid, and the substantive due process analysis of the Lochner era, 21 8 it may be possible to justify an exception from the minimum rationality standard for certain types of regulatory takings.
This Comment has already suggested that the Takings Clause does not provide for any independent test of means-end rationality and that only the Due Process Clause requires such scrutiny. Thus, if a compelling rationale for the substantial relationship test is to be developed, it must conform to the principles enunciated by the Court in United States v. Carolene Products Co.
9
Although the Court's opinion in Carolene Products established the deferential standard of due process review of social and economic legislation known as the "rational relation" test, it did suggest that higher scrutiny would be appropriate to protect "discrete and insular" minorities which might not effectively be protected by the political process.
22
1 While racial minorities have typically been the beneficiaries of this notion, there is no reason why other types of minority groups should not benefit from an exception to the rational relation standard if there is reason to believe that their interests may be so discrete from the remainder of the population or their number so limited that they are unprotected by the political process.
A zoning measure, property tax, or other land use regulation which applies to a large number of individuals probably does not warrant review under any standard other than the deferential rational relation test. Since a large number of individuals would be affected, they would presumably have the economic and political 211 See supra notes 37-43, 160-90 and accompanying text. TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE strength necessary to ensure that their interests are represented and to expose any unfairness or wrongdoing associated with the regulation.
Exactions such as those involved in Nollan, however, present a different set of circumstances. When individuals or small groups of individuals are singled out by government and forced to surrender property rights, they may have little ability to appeal to the political process. Few in number and possessing limited resources in the aggregate, they may have little or no ability to affect the outcome of the political process. If an exaction is required of an individual, she may not even be aware that there are other similarly affected individuals with whom she may unite for political purposes. Even if an appeal to the electorate at large were possible, the electorate may be unsympathetic to a rich individual. Worse still, the electorate may in fact be the beneficiary of the exaction or land use restriction. If, for example, one individual's land is so restricted that it can only serve as a green belt, neighboring landowners may sympathize with the plight of the affected landowner, but they may support the land use restrictions nonetheless since they may benefit in the form of enhanced property values due to reduced supply of improvable land and the environmental and aesthetic benefits of the green belt. In sum, a government which takes from a few and gives to many may be quite popular indeed.
In fact, Justice Stevens has noted that the "principle of generality is well-rooted in our broader understandings of the Constitution as designed in part to control the 'mischiefs of faction.'"221 As Richard Epstein has explained:
The generality requirement in turn is said to lead to the conclusion that regulations are suspect when they "single out" individual landowners to bear the brunt of special exaction, so that any broad based zoning plan is far less likely to meet with constitutional difficulty than a plan targeted to a small group of individuals.
While members of the Court have noted that the scope of a regulation is a factor to be considered in determining whether a taking has occurred, they have failed to establish a nexus between the standard of review to be applied and the generality with which a regulation affects the electorate.
